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Abstract
This paper describes necessary elements for constructing theoretical
models of network and system administration. Armed with a theoretical
model it becomes possible to determine best practices and optimal strate-
gies in a way which objectively relates policies and assumptions to results
obtained. It is concluded that a mixture of automation and human, or
other intelligent incursion is required to fully implement system policy
with current technology. Some aspects of the author’s immunity model
for automated system administration are explained, as an example. A the-
oretical framework makes the prediction that the optimal balance between
resource availability and garbage collection strategies is encompassed by
the immunity model.
1 Introduction
System administration is the realm of computer science which deals with the
planning, configuration and maintenance of computer systems. It is presently a
discipline founded mainly on the anecdotal experiences of system managers[1].
To date, no formal (mathematical) analyses of system administration have been
undertaken, with the aim of making more scientific studies. This makes it dif-
ficult to express objective truths about the field, avoiding marketing assertions
and the vested interests of companies and individuals, which are common in the
commercial sector.
The aim of the present work is to establish a formal basis for the field, a
way of formulating a framework for objective discussions about computer man-
agement. It will hopefully serve as a bridge between mathematical disciplines
and system administrators. In this respect, the paper may be viewed mainly as
a commentary, laying some foundations for future work, rather than providing
immediate solutions.
In previous work, it has been shown how the average behaviour of systems
of computers and users can be approximated by a blend of statistical models
and thermodynamical ideas[2]. That work allows us to form a mathematical
model of computer systems which can be used as a basis for modelling system
administration. The study of computer behaviour has much in common with
the physics of thermodynamics. From a coarse mathematical viewpoint, system
1
administration can be viewed in much the same way as thermodynamical exper-
iments with pistons and engines, i.e. moving information and resources around
in such a way as to change the state of the system. However this viewpoint is
mainly useful in a calculational setting. System administration also has much in
common with medicine. In many ways, system administration is medical science
for computers: a somewhat simpler problem than that of human physiology, but
nonetheless involving many of the same themes: nutrition, regulation, immunity
and repair.
What then should a theory of system administration be about? The task
of elucidating this sounds straightforward, but it is a slippery business. System
administration, in reality, is based on mainly qualitative, high level concepts,
which mix technical and sociological issues at many levels. Although it is clear
to system administrators that there is a body of technical principles involved in
the discipline, it remains somewhat intangible from the viewpoint of a scientist.
It is hard to find anything of general, reproducible value on which to base a
more quantitative theory.
One of the obstacles to formulating such a theory is the complexity of interac-
tion between humans and computers. There are many variables in a computer
system, which are controlled at distributed locations. Computer systems are
complex in the sense of having many embedded causal relationships and con-
trolling parameters. Computer behaviour is strongly affected by human social
behaviour, which is often unpredictable. The task of identifying and completely
specifying the ideal state is therefore a non-trivial one. It is nonetheless this task
which this paper attempts to address. Can one formulate a quantitative theory
of system administration, which is general enough to be widely applicable, but
which is specific enough to admit analysis?
If this, already significant problem can be addressed in sufficient terms, one
might then aim to look further towards general regulatory systems and approach
more ambitious questions. It is not difficult to see many analogous questions in
other areas of science, which could be applicable to system administration. For
instance: what is the effectiveness of generalized immunity and repair systems[3]
(automatic repair and regulation)? Is there an optimal strategy for error de-
tection and correction? Is a system administrator’s human mind (playing the
role of doctor/surgeon) better or worse than a mechanistic response or immune
system? This last point is often a bone of contention in the system adminis-
tration community. Should tasks be automated? Or should a human lawgiver
always remain in manual control? What is more efficient? Biological systems
point to the need for both types of management: at any given moment, a doc-
tor’s intelligence and superior human cognition can compensate for a lack of
adaptation in our programmed immune responses, but the automatic immune
response is both faster and more capable than a doctor when its program is
sufficient. Certainly the empirical evidence in biological information systems is
compelling: after billions of years of evolution, nature has established immune
systems in all vertebrates larger than a tadpole. Of course, this is no indication
that the solution is optimal. No acceptable analysis has been used to demon-
strate this yet. It could be that vertebrate evolution is merely poised on some
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plateau between minima of much deeper importance.
The aim of this paper then is to elevate system administration from an
expression of subjective opinion to a more objective, scientific level, hopefully
without inflating it meaninglessly into pseudo-science or philosophy. In order
to limit the length of this paper, solutions of the models and constraints will
be kept to a minimum here. However, it will be possible to draw a few general
conclusions, even without reference to specific models.
The outline of this paper is as follows. To begin the discussion it is necessary
to establish some basic axioms. It is important to restrict the scope of what a
theory of system administration encapsulates; without such a restriction, one
ends up with either many disjointed pieces or only vague hand-waving notions.
Having determined the ground rules, it is then appropriate to identify the basic
operations which can be carried out within that scope. This identification is
required in order to formulate a discussion of strategies for system management.
Once this level of formality has been attained, strategies can be formulated,
based on types of action and timing and the task of administrating a computer
system can be described in precise game theoretical terms. This is the primary
goal of this work.
2 The scope of system administration
One of the first obstacles in discussing the theory of system administration is
defining its scope. System administrators are called upon to perform all manner
of tasks as part of their duties. This battery of skills has no particular cohesion
or structure to it, so it resists formalization. We must improve on this situation
if we are to make progress in forming a theory of system administration. In
particular, we must restrict its scope to encompass only core activities. These
core activities will include insuring availability, efficiency, and security for all
users, and finally fault diagnosis of the system. This includes issues such as
software installation and upgrades, which can be classified under availability
and efficiency. It also includes user management to a certain extent, though
it will not be useful to address the issue of creation of user accounts in this
context.
3 On scales
A well known feature of descriptions of complex systems is that a complete un-
derstanding is best organized as a unification of the partial understanding of
the system at several different levels or scales. Complex systems are often so
disparate at different scales that quite different descriptions are required to cap-
ture the full essence. A theory of system behaviour at, say the microscopic level
of system calls, need not resemble a theory for the behaviour at a macroscopic
scale of larger entities, such as patterns of user behaviour. Both are needed in
order to understand the whole hierarchy of things going on.
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If one is only interested in high level phenomena, then the details of low
level phenomena are seldom directly relevant, to a good approximation. This
is the principle of separation of scales. The principle states that, as one moves
from microscopic to macroscopic scales, new behaviour can emerge as collective
phenomena, which often depends only weakly on the microscopic details of the
levels below. This is a simple idea, which is quite intuitive, but which has far
reaching consequences. It can easily be appreciated with the help of a couple of
examples.
A bridge, for instance, has the property of spanning a distance and carrying
weight, regardless of whether it is made from steel or copper or wood. The
choice of material and the microscopic arrangement of atoms in the metal or
wood, of course, tells us something about the strength of the bridge, but perhaps
not as much as the structure of the bridge at the scale of the whole thing. In
other words, the construction of the bridge at the scale of the users of the bridge
is far more important to its function than the microscopic construction of its
pieces under a microscope.
Similarly, to an acceptable approximation, the behaviour and operation of a
sales database, at the level of information transactions (their order and type), is
more important to an information retrieval system than how those transactions
are implemented through system calls (e.g. whether the system runs on Unix
or on NT). The ability to retrieve information does not depend on whether the
storage medium is, an IDE or a SCSI disk. The same job will be done regardless.
To summarize, a description of system behaviour at a high level is, for many
purposes, independent of specific details of the lower levels. Computer systems
can be modelled by generic computer systems with certain high level charac-
teristics; similarly users can be modelled as idealized users, also with common
characteristics. A theory of system administration will be most successful if it
appeals to such generalities, rather than delving into unnecessary specifics.
4 Axioms of system administration
To begin a formal discussion, we need to establish a frame of reference, i.e. the
ground rules for the discussion. In this section, a basic fundament is proposed
with the aim of striking a balance between reality and suitability for analysis.
It is also necessary to partially limit the scope of the discussion to avoid un-
necessary complication. Although the aim of this presentation is not precise
mathematical rigor, it is the aim to indicate that such a rigor is possible and
to indicate how it can be provided. A secondary aim is to communicate the
key elements of the discussion to a more theoretical audience; for these reasons,
the language adopted is one which is meant to build bridges between system
administration and more mathematical disciplines. Readers are asked to keep
an open mind with regard to use of terms however, since technical disciplines
often use words in meanings which are specific to those disciplines, and this
could lead to confusion.
A computer system is analogous to a community[4] composed of many in-
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teracting and competing players: i.e. users and administrators. It can only
properly be discussed in terms of the aims and activities of this collective and
of individual members of that community. Not all the members of a community
share the same objectives, as a general rule. Traugott and Huddleston have
pointed out[5] that it is often pertinent to view a local computer community as
a single virtual machine, rather than as a conglomeration of individual hosts. In
this paper, the term computer system will be used to refer to the collective hosts
of a local domain, or some appropriate logical unit of networked computers. It
is taken for granted that there may be internal competition for resources and
even conflict between competing parties.
In order to formulate a theory of system administration we must establish
a set of possible goals, procedures and obstructions and state them in formal
terms. The aims and intentions of each computer system are different; usually
they are prescribed by a system policy, i.e. a formal statement of intent and
allowed practice. The aim is then to postulate or derive strategies which best
achieve those goals, given the essential constraints. From this viewpoint, one
expects the language of constrained competition to play a role in a theory of
system administration. Even if one could frame such a theory in formal terms,
what would be the purpose of such an exercise? The principal benefit of such
an attempt is to create a rigid protocol for discussing system administration,
which is general enough to cover most of the actual problems and possibilities,
but which is stringent enough to prevent its perversion by parties with vested
interests in proving a certain point of view.
There is a number of stages in this programme. To begin with, one needs
some basic axioms which all parties agree on, propositions which define the aims
of system administration. Next one needs to abstract a model of a computer
system which is sufficient to capture the dynamical interaction between all of the
players, but which is sufficiently simple to be surrendered for analysis. Here we
shall suppose that a computer’s resources (memory, CPU, disk etc) are divided
into two parts,
R = Rc ⊕Rm, (1)
i.e. a part which determines the behavioural configuration parameters C of
the system working resources, and a remainder part (the working resources
themselves) which users of the system can change as a normal part of their
interaction with the system. This remainder part can be observed over an
appropriate time scale, giving a set of measurements M which indicate how the
system is being used.
The different possible configurations of the system resources {C} are made
up from the independent operation types {T } which lead to these configurations.
From this definition one needs to be sure that a unique description is possible,
i.e. eliminate points of contention about the description itself. Finally, one
must be sure that the description is sufficiently complete, i.e. that there exists
a mapping between policy and system configuration which is as complete as the
problem itself. The purpose of this section is to introduce the key players in
this description, in advance of a fuller description in the coming sections.
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In order to state the purpose of system administration, we may take the
basic tenet or principle to be the following:
Basic assumption 1 The requirements and constraints of any computer sys-
tem are defined at any time t by an implementable system policy P (t). This
policy determines the actions or rules of play for a system administrator, but
not necessarily the actions of users. It includes a specification of which and how
many users are allowed to access the system.
The policy P (t) is not usually a continuous function of time, but may change
catastrophically (in the mathematical sense) over a time scale which is much
longer than the time scale over which users act and make changes to the system.
The nature of this policy is not yet determined.
In order to make a policy implementable, it must be possible to relate it
to a complete configuration instruction for the system C(t), through rules and
constraints. These rules and constraints could be issued verbally to users, or
could be programmed into configuration files of software components which form
the system. A single complete configuration instruction for the system can be
thought of as being a sum of two parts:
C = Cr ⊕ Cu, (2)
a specification of resource configurations Cr which describe how the software
and hardware landscape is configured, and a specification of user configurations
Cu, which describes who is allowed to do what with the resources (this includes
remote, network users who access services through local agents). A specification
of user configurations Cu (numbers of users and their rights to resources) could
easily be separated from system policy conceptually, but it is convenient to view
the policy as a complete specification of the system plus its intended and actual
usage. The meaning of the symbol ⊕ is that of a heuristic union: configuration
specifications take many forms (are objects of many types). They are most
easily thought of as sets of more primitive objects, in which case the addition
of sets implies their strict union.
A complete configuration instruction can be thought of geometrically as a
point in a vector space, which is found by adding together instructions of linearly
independent (orthogonal) types. One does this by introducing a set of primitive
configuration instruction types {T i}, and writing the complete configuration as
a linear combination of these:
C =
∑
i
ciT
i, (3)
with set-valued coefficients ci. The basis of primitive configuration operations
will be described later. A complete configuration usually contains instructions
for the operators of the system also. The system administrator can also be
viewed as part of this system for the sake of abstraction.
The set of all configurations {C} contains much redundancy. Let us imagine
that the mapping of complete configuration instructions to the final state of the
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system is many to one, and that this multiplicity can be represented by a group
of permutations and transformations G1. Thus equivalent configurations could
be formed by permuting configuration instructions, if ordering is unimportant,
or by exchanging (transforming) one component of the configuration for another.
An example of this is the following: the configuration of a World Wide Web
service might be possible with several equivalent software systems, each with
equivalent configuration files: in this case, these would form an equivalence class.
Conversely, if even a minor detail distinguishes them, then they are inequivalent
configurations.
Let us define an implementable policy P (t) as being any representative mem-
ber of the set of equivalent configurations {C(t)}
P (t) ≡ {C(t)}/G. (4)
A policy could naturally mean more than a configuration (or computer and its
operators), but as long as other aspects of the policy cannot be implemented
by either machine or human, they are irrelevant to the system. Having related
policy to configuration instructions, the path is clear to define the state S(t) of
the system.
Let a state of the system describe a single configuration of users Cu, of system
resources Cr and a set of measured average metrics M which summarizes the
average usage of the system in relation to the users[2]. The metricsM represent
a first order response (feedback interaction) between users and resources. The
state is written, again, as a direct sum
Sp ≡
(
Cr ⊕ Cu
G
)
⊕M(Cr, Cu) (5)
where the behavioural metrics M(Cr, Cu) are functions of resources and user
activity. One may now state the following provable hypothesis.
Theorem 1 Any sufficiently complete system policy P (t) specifies, by impli-
cation, a representative average ideal state Sp(t), from an equivalence class of
ideal states {S} under G, for the computer system concerned, over user time-
scales Tu, provided that the rate of change of policy dP/dt is much smaller than
changes in user behaviour dM/dt, i.e. the policy changes on the order of weeks
or months rather than hours or days.
Corollary: The ideal state can only be identified on average, since interactions
with unpredictable user activity are constantly causing fluctuations δS(t) in the
state of the system. These fluctuations also occur at a rate dM/dt≫ dP/dt.
The existence of an ideal state has already been used in designing the au-
thor’s site Configuration Engine (cfengine)[6], but it has not previously been
1The nature of this group could be fairly complicated and is not particularly important
to the discussion. The fact that the redundancy, in principle, may be represented by a
mathematical group is an idealization which is attainable in in theory. It is not an expression
of the current state of affairs in the world of computers.
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explained at length. The proof of this theorem is straightforward, from the
definitions. Every computer system has a finite set of resources and configura-
tion objects which is completely prescribed by a total configuration Cp. Each
resource object may be in a state described by a finite length bit string, de-
scribing a distinct configuration si ∈ Cr. There is therefore a mapping from the
configuration Cp to the actual state
Cp → Sp + δS. (6)
This mapping is one to many, since δS is a stochastic variable. The averag-
ing operation eliminates the non-uniqueness by extinguishing δS, provided the
averaging process is defined, i.e., dδS/dt ≫ dP/dt. Thus any complete set of
average measurements contributes to the average state in a well-defined manner.
The meaning of ‘sufficiently complete system policy’ is now clear. The cov-
ering of the policy domain must be as large as the domain of state one wishes to
cover, since it follows from the above definitions that the association of policies
to states is now one to one, after one factors out the equivalences G. The unique-
ness is secured by making the configuration instruction itself a part of the state.
Without this, there would still be ambiguity, since there is no guarantee that a
measurement M(Cr , Cu) is a unique function of its arguments. This completes
the proof.
This sufficiency referred to above has the corollary that an incomplete system
policy P1 cannot determine a unique state for the whole system, only a part of
it. An incomplete policy divides the system into two or more parts, since the
total policy is still in one to one correspondence with the states.
P1 + P2 + . . .→ Sp1 + Sp2 + . . . (7)
By the virtue of the fundamental theorem, we have the important conclusion
that the necessary and sufficient condition for implementation a policy P (t) (i.e.
the ability to map it onto a system configuration over a period of time) is that
the total average state S(t) = Sp(t).
Let us take a moment to understand the structure and meaning of average
ideal state. It is tempting to think of the system as being in an ideal state at
some time t0 and then deviating from it at later times. The precise state of the
system at some reference time might seem to characterize an ideal to our sub-
jective judgement, but the ideal state of configuration must change with time,
since the computer system is, by nature, influenced by users whose activities
are not completely secured by a policy. To freeze one’s view of the ideal in time,
is to place unreasonable restrictions on the use of the system (we shall see this
later in examples connected to the use of fixed disk quotas). A specification
of resource and user boundary conditions is not the same as a specification of
the ideal dynamical behaviour of the system, if users are allowed to act on the
resources.
Given that the policy and user configurations are stable over the prescribed
time-scales, one may take the average value (or distribution of values) for
each metric which characterizes the response of system over shorter time-scales
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M(Cr , Cu) as being representative of the state at time t. This summarizes the
effect of feedback of users on resources, or the statistical interaction between
the users and the system. Since we have prescribed every bit string affecting
the dynamics of the system at the outset as policy, and we have measured the
average result of those prescriptions at time t, we have a complete description
of the system in terms of an implementable policy.
Sp = P ⊕M(P ). (8)
Not surprisingly, this expression is directly analogous to linear response theory
in the physics of time-varying systems. The policy plays the role of a constraint
of the motion, while the statistical metric M , has the role of the integrated
response of the evolved state at time t. The ‘equations of motion’ which lead to
the evolution of a system also have an analogue here: they are the operations
carried out by the system software on the resources.
P
M
Sp
_
_
C
C
C
r
u
Figure 1: The existence of an ideal state. This picture shows the mapping of
equivalent configurations of users Cu plus hardware Cr to a factored set C/G
which can be interpreted as the set of implementable policies P . A unique
configuration results in a measurable effect on the system M , i.e. the feedback
resulting from the policy P . The combination of the configuration with its
average effect on the system defines a unique state S.
The permutation or invariance group G is of no concern to this paper except
as a matter of principle for the most pedantic. It is a heuristic representation
of all of the involved details which are irrelevant to a theoretical formulation,
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but which occur in practice2. Nevertheless, it has a theoretical implication: the
ideal state S has a number of equivalent representations, e.g. those formed by
permuting or swapping configuration details whose ordering or equivalence is
unimportant. This multiplicity could be a benefit or a hazard to the task of
implementation of policy. This remains to be determined.
Having established the existence of an ideal state, the second basic assump-
tion is:
Basic assumption 2 The long term aim of system administration is to opti-
mize the policy P (t) for maximum productivity, insofar as this is allowed by local
constraints. The short term aim is to keep the system as close to the resulting
ideal state Sp(t) as possible, i.e. to minimize fluctuations δS = S − S.
One expects the average state Sp to exhibit persistent behaviour however,
i.e. be invariant for periods approaching the duration of the system policy. Note
that, what we are essentially doing, by making the assertion of an ideal state,
is to separate slowly varying changes from quickly varying changes.
S(t) = Sp(t) + δS(t). (9)
Errors and misconfigurations (fluctuations δS) can accumulate over short peri-
ods of time, shorter than the time scale over which the average or ideal state
changes. In terms of the relative rates of change:
max
∣∣∣∣ 1δS
d
dt
δS
∣∣∣∣≫ max
∣∣∣∣ 1Sp
d
dt
Sp
∣∣∣∣ . (10)
The business of system administration is therefore a problem in regulation, or
in minimizing the effect of δS.
We arrive at the following: a theory of system administration would attempt
to answer the questions:
Is there an optimal strategy for keeping the system as close as possible
to its ideal state, and maximize its productivity?
To answer these questions, we must understand more deeply the meaning of
the abstract formulation above. To begin, we backtrack and re-examine the
underpinning concepts.
2The fact that such details do indeed represent a set, indeed a group of permutations and
transformations is clear from the empirical facts. The factoring of redundancy means picking
only one representative member of each configuration which gives the same results, in the
same manner that factor groups are formed in group theory. Indeed, it is a trivial technical
point that the sets and equivalence classes in a computer system may all be represented by
operations on a single binary string (a computing machine does precisely this on a finite,
possibly disjointed binary string). The existence of transformations with closure is assured by
extending a binary string to encompass all possibiluties; the existence of an inverse is trivial
for permutations, as is the existence of a null operation and associativity. That the formal
factor group exists follows from the existence of heuristic equivalences with respect to system
function.
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5 A generic computer system
In order to elucidate the goals of computer configuration and maintenance, it
will be necessary to identify the main characteristics of computer systems at a
suitable level of abstraction. These include finding:
• Relevant variables,
• Invariances,
• Persistent structures,
• Sources of information loss or entropy,
which affect the principal goals. Several studies of computer systems have at-
tempted to identify such qualities[7, 2, 8] and it is hypothesized that a suitably
abstracted description can be built on the few simple principles identified by
these authors.
The basic model of a computer is that of a dynamical community of processes
and resources, coupled to an external environment (an external source or force).
The source includes the stochastic influences of all of the users of the system, and
any other computer systems which communicate with hosts within the perimeter
of our own system. As pointed out in ref. [5], the issue of networking does not
increase the complexity of the administration problem, only its localization and
perhaps its magnitude. A set of networked hosts, sending external messages, is
simply a single virtual host with internal inter-process communication.
The variables, important in characterizing the usage of a computer system,
are measures of average behaviour, such as rate of work, numbers of processes,
network connections and so forth[2]. Other measures, such as average service
latencies, affect the system only at the level of the network. Latencies are very
complex phenomena and are unlikely to be predictable by any simple model.
Invariances refer to the independence of qualities and values to changes. In
the long run, there are no features of a computer system which are fully constant,
but for long periods of time, certain things can be considered invariant. For
instance, the software tools one uses to edit a file usually make no difference
to the outcome, thus the outcome of an editing operation may be considered
invariant with respect to differences in software used; the CPU efficiency of the
software used makes no difference to the result in most cases. Invariance could
also mean that a particular piece of software never changes (is never upgraded),
or that the content of a configuration file is fixed with respect to other changes.
In the space of changes, such invariances may be considered to be ignorable
coordinates.
Persistent structures are, like invariances, values or qualities which do not
change over appreciable periods of time. This includes checksums of impor-
tant software, kernel profiles of software; it might also include numbers of user
accounts. Persistent structures are not expected to change. Changes in these
structures might be considered anomalous behaviour.
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An important characteristic of computer systems is that they are strongly
coupled to human users’ behaviour patterns. The majority of human users follow
strict daily and weekly work patterns and this is reflected in many measurements
of system resource behaviour. A consequence of this is that measurements which
are periodically constrained are distributed according to a Planck spectrum.
The Planck spectrum can therefore be considered a general characteristic of
computer statistics in many cases.
6 The scope of a theory of system administra-
tion
Even a limited theory of system administration should cover some key aspects
of the problem:
• Policy determination,
• Strategic decisions about resource usage,
• Productivity considerations (the economics of the system),
• Empirical verification of strategies and policies,
• Efficiency of policy and of policy implementation,
• Efficiency of the system in doing its job.
More pragmatic details such as the need for software installation and upgrade
have to be tackled at an abstract level, in terms of productivity, probability
of failure, resource usage and so on. Software bugs can be addressed in terms
of productivity or security. Security, in turn can be viewed as a contest for
resources at the level of the system.
The benefits of automation versus human incursion are often discussed in
system administration, sometimes as a bone of contention. This is one area
that a theory of system administration can address objectively and have a real
prospect of answering once and for all. An aspect of this will be discussed later
as an example.
6.1 Measures and characters
As an empirical science, system administration suffers from many shortcomings.
It has all of the problems associated with the social sciences: statistical measures
are seldom forthcoming, experimental repeatability is a luxury, and sufficient
repetition to obtain statistically meaningful samples is a near impossibility. The
conditions under which measurements are made are constantly changing. The
situation is somewhat analogous to that of non-equilibrium statistical mechanics
in physics, but markedly less controlled.
The characteristics which are of interest to us refer to the actions and re-
sults which inter-weave in the dynamical behaviour of the system. These include
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the quality of actions of the system administrator, in relation to the prescribed
policy, a typical characterization of the environment which affects the system.
The measurements which are most useful are those based on persistent vari-
ables, since these have a stable value. Other fluctuating values can be treated
stochastically or averaged out into persistent values.
The following measures will be useful in formulating ‘pay-off’ matrices for
administration models, as in the example to follow below. The accuracy with
which a policy is implemented by an agent of system management (human or
automatic system) can be gauged with the following ratio:
Accuracy =
Number of policy actions
All actionsperformed
(11)
i.e. the fraction of work which is within prescribed guidelines. In algebraic
terms:
α =
Np(t)
N(t)
=
∑
(a⊂P )
Na
∑
(∀a)
Na
(12)
For humans α ≤ 1. For any bug-free automatic system, α = 1. Similarly, one
may define the efficiency of a system by its use of resources (memory and CPU
share):
Efficiency = Accuracy×
(
1−
Resources used
Resources available
)
(13)
In algebraic terms:
ε = α

1−
∑
(a⊂P )
ra
∑
(∀a)
ra

 (14)
i.e. the more resources which are consumed in implementing a policy, the less
efficient it can be considered to be.
Other measures are more useful for describing the relationship of a computer
system to its environment, or the influential forces which steer its dynamical
evolution. The response of a computer system to its users is characterized
by averages which fluctuate in time. Human society’s diurnal work pattern
imposes a twenty four hour periodic character on these measurements[7, 2] and
a also a weekly work pattern, which is dominant during weekdays and slight
at weekends (at least in the Western world). The periodic topology implies
that the distribution of resource usage takes on the special form of a Planck
distribution with a Gaussian component, by analogy with statistical physics at
temperature T :
D(λ) = A e
−
(
(λ−λ)2
2σ2
)
+
B
(λ− λ0)3(e1/(λ−λ0)T − 1)
. (15)
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λ is the deviation of a measurement from its average value over a period. The
values of the constants A, B, λ0 and T may be chosen to fit the behaviour
of any variable which is strongly coupled to periodic usage. Their absolute
values have no significance, since there is no ‘standard candle’ computer system
to compare to, but changes relative to the local norm could be interpreted as
anomalies. Non-zero A allows for the presence of additional Gaussian noise in
some measurements.
6.2 Interactions of time scales
The identification of suitable time-scales is of crucial importance to any dynam-
ical problem. Time-scales control rates of competition which lead to balance,
and also rates of change.
It is easy to show that human administrators only compete with automatic
systems in speed and efficiency at times of the day when they have nothing
pressing to do. Indeed, it is always possible to arrange for an automatic system
to beat a human, provided it can run in overlapping instantiations. A straight-
forward comparison of the time-scales involved in automated maintenance, to
those of manual human maintenance can be made for any operation which is
programmable in an automatic system with available technology.
Alarm systems which merely notify humans of errors and then rely on a
human response are intrinsically slower than automatic systems which repair
errors, provided the alarms represent errors which can be corrected with current
automation.
The response time tauto of a automatic machine system M , falls between
two bounds (see figure 1)
nTp + Te(A) ≥ tauto ≥ Te(A) (16)
where Tp is the scheduling period for regular execution of the system (e.g. the
cron interval, typically half-hour to an hour), Te(A) is the execution time of the
automatic system (typically seconds). The integer n ≥ 0 since the number of
iterations of the automatic system required to fix a problem might be greater
than one. The time required to make a decision about the correct course of
action Td(A) is negligible for the automatic system.
For a human being, making a decision based on a predecided policy, the
response time thuman falls between the limits:
∞ ≥ thuman ≥ Tw(H) + Td(H) + Te(H). (17)
Td(H) is again the decision time, or time required to determine the correct
policy response (typically seconds to minutes). Te(H) is the time required for a
human to execute the required remedy (typically seconds to minutes). Tw(H) is
the time for which the human is busy or unavailable to respond to the request,
i.e. the wait-time. The availability of human beings is limited by social and
physiological considerations. In a simple way, one can expect this to follow a
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Figure 2: Overlapping work rates of human and automatic systems.
pattern in which the response time is greatest during the night; simplistically,
if one assumes that humans sleep 8 hours,
Tw(H) > 4(1 + sin(t/24)), (18)
where time is measured in hours, whereas
Tw(A) ≃ 0. (19)
We can note that human response times are usually much longer than the cor-
responding machine response times,
Td(A)≪ Td(H)
Te(A)≪ Te(H) (20)
and that the periodic interval of execution of the automatic system is generally
taken to be greater than the execution time of the automatic system
Tp ≥ Te, (21)
thus avoiding overlapping executions (though this is not necessarily a prob-
lem, see the discussion of adaptive locks[9]) It is always possible to choose the
scheduling interval to be arbitrarily close to Te(A) (i.e. as short as one likes).
Then provided,
Tw(H) > Te(A) (22)
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the automatic system can always win over a human. This last inequality requires
qualification however, since very long jobs (such as backups or file tree parses)
increase exponentially in time with the size of the file tree concerned. This
makes a prediction: it tells us that one should always arrange to allow such long
jobs to be run last in a sequence of maintenance tasks, and also in overlappable
threads. This means that long jobs will not hinder the rapid execution of a
maintenance program.
Cfengine[6] allows overlapping runs using its scheme of adaptive locks[9].
Thus, by scheduling long jobs last in a cfengine program, it is virtually always
possible for cfengine to beat a human, unless it is prevented from running, or the
human is given the chance to respond with a head-start; this seldom happens
by chance.
7 Primitive moves
Having identified the principle aims and methods of system administration, one
is free to represent a model for these in any convenient calculational scheme.
Almost immediately, one is confounded by the multiplicity, or non-uniqueness of
the mapping between problem and solution: It is common-lore amongst system
administrators, and it is to be expected logically in any causal web, that
• One problem can have several solutions.
• Several problems can be solved with a single solution.
How should one classify such mappings? By coarse-graining? Some degree of
coarse classification is inevitable to make the analysis tractable, but it needs to
be performed in a well-defined way. To some extent, we have already dealt with
this problem in the factoring out of redundant expression in section 2. However
the same problem returns in specifying the actions required to maintain the
ideal state.
In order to unravel this situation as far as possible, it is reasonable to try
to express problems and solutions in terms of linear combinations of primitive
actions. The analysis of primitive operations has already been considered by
Burgess in ref. [6] in developing automated approach to system administra-
tion. There is little to add here, except to say that it is required that every
implementable policy be decomposable as a combination of these primitives.
The available channels for action, i.e. the possible moves which a ‘player of
the computer system game’ (user or administrator) can choose from, form a huge
set if one views them at the level of the user. Formulating generic activity would
be an intractable problem if one chose to consider every nuance of the system,
viewed from a user perspective. Fortunately it is possible to break down the
variety of activities available to users into a number of primitive actions. Any
task can be considered as some linear combination of these few basic actions.
The actions are:
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Primitive type T i Comments/Examples
Create file
Delete file Tidy garbage
Rename file Disable
Edit file Used in configuration
Access control Permissions
Request resource Read/Mount
Copy file Read/write
Process control Start/stop
Process priority Nice
Configure device
We should be careful to distinguish between how functions are implemented
and how they can be decomposed. The method of implementation is not nec-
essarily relevant to the analysis. What is important is that there exists a finite
number of primitive actions which can be used to express all others in combi-
nations.
Are these primitives sufficient in themselves? Could we implement the fol-
lowing policy, for instance: downloading of pornographic material between the
hours of 9:00 and 17:00 is forbidden? If such a policy is implementable by an
automatic system, it must be possible to filter content-specific data. Such a
filter would need a configuration file which would need to be edited. The time-
dependent behaviour could be handled by a scheduler, also configured by a text
file. These configuration details are all implementable with file editing and pro-
cess control. The ability of software to perform the task has to be assumed.
This has nothing to do with management of the system. If the same job is to
be carried out by a human, then the model of the management system must be
extended to include humans, in which case job control and job definition require
the analogous concepts to file editing and process control, for human brains. In
other words, when humans are involved in a theory of manual work, they must
be considered a part of the computer system.
8 The ideal average state
In order to have a chance of repairing damage, or maintaining a detailed balance
of resources, we need to be able to trace the development or history of the
system, from an ideal average state at an initial time, to a less than ideal state
at a later time. In accordance with the axioms lain out at the beginning of the
paper, it is assumed that the ideal state is determined as a matter of policy, by
local considerations.
Many minor changes take place all the time in a computer system; these are
healthy. Programs are started and stopped, files are created and destroyed: this
is part of the work done by the system. However, certain features of the system
should not change greatly (they should be persistent, at least on average). For
instance, resources like disks and network services should be available to users
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at all times. If a crucial service falls out, then it affects other changes in the
system.
Some changes are important to operation of the system, others are unim-
portant. For instance, it would be unimportant if one swapped the process ID’s
of two programs. The process ID is just a label which has no bearing on the
performance of the system or the productivity of users. However, if one process
stopped running prematurely, this would be a change of state.
If we know what changes have taken place to move the system away from the
ideal state, it should be possible to undo them, provided these do not involve the
destruction of useful work. To accomplish this tracking of changes, in formal
terms, we need to quantify the state of the system with respect to specific
changes3. Suppose one considers system administration as a game, framed on a
lattice of n-dimensions, and suppose that the system has an ideal state located
at the origin of this lattice, based on a policy and described in terms of primitive
system variables. Each node of the lattice is a new state of the system. Let
us suppose that the aim of the game is to remain as close as possible to the
ideal state, i.e. the origin of this discrete space. How can one formulate such
a game? How many dimensions does the lattice extend into, and what do they
represent? These questions are central to formulating an analysis.
In a general sense, a computer system is a dynamical system like any other,
and it must follow the same basic principles as any set of variables which changes
in time. Let φi(t), where i = 1, 2, ...N be the set of measurable variables which
can be associated with a computer system. A canonically complete dynamical
system can be associated with the set of phase-space variables,
qi(t) , q˙i(t),
i.e. the variables and their time derivatives. Not all variables can be considered
differentiable functions of time, but it will be possible to give the derivative a
meaning even for discrete variables, so this may be regarded symbolically for
the present. Given that the values of these variables can change statistically
with time (the nature of this variation will be qualified later), at any time t, we
can decompose the value of q(t) into a local average and a fluctuating piece.
q(t) = q(t) + δq(t). (23)
This means essentially decomposing q(t) into fast and slowly changing variables.
The average value q(t) varies only slowly with time, but many rapid changes
δq(t) fluctuate about the average value. The average may be defined by
qi(t) =
1
t− ti
∫ t
ti
qi(t
′) dt′, (24)
3Note that, while one is interested in tracking changes in principle, in order to formulate the
theory of system changes, this does not imply memorizing changes in a system is a desirable
thing to do. Some system administration tools attempt to do this, often unsuccessfully, but as
a counter-example one has cfengine which simply acts as a generic counter-force, pushing the
system towards the ideal state, regardless of what specific historical chain the system follow.
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where t − ti is the interval over which the average is taken, and it is assumed
that
t− ti < t− t0, (25)
where t0 is the ‘zeroth’ time at which the system was in the ideal state. The rate
at which variables are changing q˙(t) can also be measured. A similar procedure
can be implemented for the N derivatives and their local average values.
For the sake of characterizing the state of the system, one is interested in
change in the average values since some ideal zeroth time t0:
di ≡
{
qi(t)− qi(t0), q˙i(t)− q˙i(t0)
}
. (26)
In terms of the deviations di in key system variables, one may postulate a
2N -dimensional lattice whose independent, orthogonal axes are the n = 2N
variables of the phase space di, for i = 1...n. Positions on this lattice are
denoted by the vector of these component deviations. It is collectively denoted
~d.
Suppose now that the system has deviated from the ideal state at ~0 and has
reached a point ~d on the lattice (see figure 2). The number of equivalent paths
H(~d) back to the ideal state, is
H(~d) =
(
n∑
j=1
dj)!
n∏
k=1
(dk!)
(27)
This grows rapidly with the Euclidean distance |~d|
|~d| ≡ d =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(di)
2. (28)
H(~d) may be considered as a measure of the entropy, or disorder in the system.
The entropy may be thought of as measuring the ‘hopelessness’ of finding the
original route which led to the deviation. If all the paths are equivalent, i.e. the
particular route by which the current state was achieved was not important,
then it measures the number of equivalent ways in which the deviation can be
fixed.
If the path is important then a different interpretation is more appropriate.
In common with its analogue from physics, H may be thought of as a measure
of the amount of potential work has been lost to the system as a result of its de-
viation from the ideal state. Or conversely, here it may be considered a measure
of the amount of work which would have to be expended in order to return the
system to its ideal state. To gauge how quickly this grows with distance, one
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Figure 3: Deviations from the ideal state may be visualized as a random walk
through a lattice of n-dimensions (here only two). The number of paths of equal
length by which one can return to the origin increases rapidly with the distance.
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may compute the rate of increase in numbers of paths as ~d increases. Define
di
∇ H(~d) =
H(~d+ ~∆d)−H(~d)
| ~∆d|
= H(d1, .., di + 1, ..dn)−H(d1, .., di, ..dn) (29)
Thus we define the rate of increase on the discrete lattice by,
di
∇ H(~d)
H(~d)
=
1
(di + 1)
n∑
j 6=i
dj ≫ 1. (30)
This shows that the increase is in fact approximately proportional to the dis-
tance. In other words, the rate of increase is approximately exponential. Clearly,
this simple quantification of cumulative system error indicates that deviations
from an ideal state should be dealt with as quickly as possible, since it becomes
increasingly difficult to make corrections as the errors are compounded.
The ideal state itself needs to be characterized in terms of reasonable tol-
erances in system variables. The important variables include the availability
of resources (ability to create new files and processes) as well as the level of
activity. In dynamical terms one considers a set of variables and their rates of
change:
q(t) ,
dq(t)
dt
. (31)
If the system is a complete characterization of every possible influence and
change in the system, then these form a simplectic algebra and the behaviour
of the system is, at least in principle, completely deterministic, if not exactly
predictable. In most cases there are influences which are not completely known,
or may be regarded as random. In that case, one moves from simple mechanical
systems into to realm of statistical mechanics and non-equilibrium studies.
These underlying variables are only indirectly linked to the ideal state,
through averaging.
The above view is quite simplistic. In reality there might not be only one
ideal state, but a set of equivalent ideal states. These can all be formulated
as direct sums or quotients of a simply-connected state space however, so these
need not be of concern to the principle of the argument. Having identified an
ideal state as a point in a vector space, or lattice, one is now free to discuss how
changes in the forces or influences on the system lead to movements through
the lattice.
9 Game theory and the contest for the ideal
state
There are two separable issues in the ideal-state view of system administration.
The distinction concerns the perceived intelligence behind the changes which
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lead to a degradation of the ideal state. We may classify changes as either
random (stochastic) or as intentional (strategic) depending on the nature of the
adversary.
This distinction is partly artificial: all changes can be traced back to the
actions of humans at some level, but it is not always pertinent to do so. Not all
users act in response to a specific provocation, or with a specific aim in mind. It
just happens that their actions lead to a general degradation of the ideal state,
no malice intended. This strikes back to the fundamental principle of detail,
namely that high level effects wash out the specifics of low-level origins. Thus
there is a part of the spectrum of changes which averages out to a kind of faceless
background noise. The details of who did what are of no concern. Random
influences have been analyzed in ref. [2] and are found to follow a number of
well-known statistical distributions. Their study is part of the problem to be
solved, but not all of it.
The other part of the problem is the case of actions which may be regarded as
being more carefully calculated, or following a systematic behavioural pattern.
These are caused by conflicts of interest between system policy and user wishes.
A suitable framework for analyzing conflicts of interest, in a closed system, is
the theory of games[10, 11]. Game theory is about introducing players, with
goals and aims, into a scheme of rules and then analyzing how much a player
can win, according to those restrictions. Each move in a game affords the
player a characteristic value, often referred to as the ‘payoff’. Game theory has
been applied to warfare, to economics (commercial warfare) and many other
situations. In this case, the game takes place on the n-dimensional board,
spanned by the ~d vectors.
There are many types or classifications of game. Some games are trivial: one-
person games of chance, for example, are not analyzable in terms of strategies,
since the actions of the player are irrelevant to the outcome. In a sense, these
are related to the first kind of deviation referred to above. Some situations in
system administration fit this scenario. More interesting, is the case in which
the outcome of the game can be determined by a specific choice of strategy on
the part of the players. The most basic model for such a game is that of a
two-person zero-sum game, or a game in which there are two players, and where
the losses of one player are the gains of the other. ‘Zero sum’ is the law of
conservation of currency (current).
Many games can be stated in terms of this basic model, although this is often
a simplification of reality. Games in complex systems are rarely true zero-sum
games: energy leaks out, money gets burned or printed and thus there is no
exact zero-sum conservation.
9.1 Models
The basic valuables of system administration are the system resources: file
space, CPU share, memory share and network share. The theory of system
administration can be viewed as a competition for these resources and for user
privileges. The central obstacle in formulating a scenario in terms of game
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theory is the classification of strategies and their evaluation in terms of a char-
acteristic (payoff) matrix.
• As a zero sum, two person game system administration is a game between
the collective users and the system administrator. The aim of the users is
to consume all of the system resources, while the aim of the administrator
is to keep the system as close as possible to its ideal state. Ideally, the
system administrators strategies should always bring the system closer to
the ideal state. This is the property of convergence referred to in ref. [6, 3].
The ideal outcome of this game is a stalemate, or equilibrium somewhere
close to the ideal state.
This game is often one with perfect information since all the important
moves are visible to both players, however both sides can engage in bluff-
ing. Clearly the administrator can win, either by limiting or reducing the
consumption of resources and by extending the resources of the system.
A user can ‘win’ in a certain pessimistic sense by moving the ideal state
so far from the ideal that the system crashes and thus the game ends.
• A more optimistic variant of the above, is to view the aim of users as
being to produce as much useful work as possible. This is a more compli-
cated aim, since users can now impede their own progress by consuming
too many resources, thus impairing the system as a whole and prevent-
ing themselves from being able to work (users need to be environmentally
friendly). Experience from reality shows that most users do not concern
themselves with this aspect however; they see it as the system adminis-
trators job to deal with such problems when they arise.
• As a zero sum, N -person game one can make a more detailed model,
in which users compete against one another in addition to the system
administrator. The system administrator’s task then becomes to act as
a kind of Robin Hood character, preventing any one user’s consumption
of all resources, trying to distribute resources fairly. Again, the aim of
the administrator is to maximize the duration of the game by keeping the
system as close to the ideal state as possible.
9.2 Payoffs and work
The next obstacle concerns the level at which we decide to address the behaviour
of the system. Appropriate measures can be defined at various levels.
In order to formulate the characteristic matrix (often called the pay-off ma-
trix) we must identify the book-keeping parameters and aims by which one
hopes to win the game. What is the currency of this system? In social systems
one has money as the book-keeping parameter for transactions. In physical sys-
tems, one has energy as the book-keeping parameter. These quantities count
resources, in some well-defined sense. An analogous quantity is needed in system
administration.
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• The aim of the system administrator is to keep the system alive and run-
ning so that users can perform useful work.
• The aim of benign users is to produce useful work using the system. The
aim of malicious users is often to maximize their control over system re-
sources.
In a community, games are not necessarily cut and dried zero-sum engagements.
We are faced with a Nash problem, or prisoner’s dilemma, which often ends in
a Nash equilibrium[12].
A user of the system who pursues solely private interests, does not
necessarily promote the best interest of the community as a whole.
In other words, users can shoot themselves in the proverbial foot by using up all
the available resources on a finite system. This affects them as much as anyone
else. The empirical evidence suggests that, on average, users consume resources
at a rate which is periodic and polynomial in time[7, 2].
W (t) ∝ sin(Ωt)
∑
n
cnt
n. (32)
A definition of work is required in order to quantify the production of useful
work in a non-prejudicial manner. Clearly the term ‘useful work’ spans a wide
variety of activities. Clearly work can increase and decrease (work can be lost
through accidents), but this is not really germane to the problem at hand. The
work generated by a user (physical and mental work and then computationally
assisted results) is a function of the information input into the system by the
user. Since the amount of computation resulting from a single input might be
infinite, in practice, the function is an unknown.
In general, the pay-off in not just a scalar value, but a vector. This indicates
that a game might actually be decomposable into a number of parallel but
interacting games.
What is the value of a game? How much can a user or an attacker hope
to win? The system administrator, or embodiment of system policy, is not
interested in winning the game, but rather in confounding the game for users
who gain too much control. The system administrator plays a similar role to
that of a police force. In some vague sense, the administrator’s jobs is to make
sure that resources are distributed fairly, according to the policies laid down for
the computer society.
9.3 Strategy expression
In a realistic situation one expects both parties in the two-person game to
use mixed strategies. The formulation of the game theoretical pay-off matrix
requires one to consider the strategies which the players can adopt. Again, the
number of possible strategies is huge and the scope for strategic contrivance is
almost infinite. In order to limit the formulation of the problem, it is necessary
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to break down strategies into linear combinations of primitives again. What is
a strategy?
• A set of operations
• A schedule of operations
• Rules for counter-moves
In addition to simple strategies, there can be meta-strategies, or long-term goals.
For instance, a nominal community strategy might be to:
• Maximize productivity or generation of work.
• Gain the largest feasible share of resources.
An attack strategy might be to
• Consume as many resources as possible.
• Destroy key resources.
Other strategies for attaining intermediate goals might include covert strategies
such as bluffing (falsely naming files). Defensive strategies might involve tak-
ing out an attacker, counter attacking, or evasion (concealment), exploitation,
trickery, antagonization, incessant complaint (spam), revenge etc. Security and
privilege, levels of access, integrity and trust must be woven into algebraic mea-
sures for the pay-off. A means of expressing these devices must be formulated
within a language which can be understood by system administrators, but which
is primitive enough to enable the problem to be analyzed in an unambiguous
fashion.
9.4 Stable and dominant strategies
It has been argued here, and in earlier papers[3, 2], that computer systems can
be viewed as fluctuating around statistically stable configurations, for the most
part. This assumes that both users and system administration mechanisms are
in approximate balance. Game theory is suited to finding equilibria, or stable
superiorities in a set of strategies. Let us consider how game theory can be used
to frame system behaviour as a contest for control of the system’s resources.
The simplest case of a two-person, zero-sum game is chosen.
We are interested in determining whether any optimal strategies can be
adopted by the system (and its administrator) in order to maintain control of
the system, i.e. in order to prevent users from winning control of the system.
This situation is analogous to the analysis of dominant evolutionary strategies,
considered by Hamilton and Maynard-Smith[13]. These so-called Evolutionary
Stable Strategies are the winning strategies favoured by natural selection mech-
anisms in the animal or plant kingdom. In our case, we are simply interested in
strategies which are clear winners over all other strategies. If we consider the
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characteristic matrix, or pay-off matrix, as a function of strategies for attack
and defense π(σa, σd), then one may characterize a dominant attack-strategy σ
∗
a
by the criterion:
π(σ∗a, σd) > π(σa, σd) (33)
i.e. σ∗a must be a better move than any other strategy against and arbitrary
counter-move σd. If this is the case, then there exists at least one pure strategy
which is optimal for the attacker. Similarly, an optimal defensive strategy σ∗d is
characterized by:
π(σa, σ
∗
d) > π(σa, σd) (34)
A more general situation is that one can find a winning mixture of strategies Σ
(a linear combination of pure strategies)
Σ =
1
N
N∑
i
ci σi. (35)
Then if the dominant mixture of strategies Σ∗a satisfies,
π(Σ∗a,Σd) > π(Σa,Σd) (36)
then the attacker must win, but if some optimal mixture of strategies Σ∗d satis-
fies,
π(Σa,Σ
∗
d) > π(Σa,Σd), (37)
then the defender must prevail. It is this final solution which one hopes to find
in order to secure a stable computer environment.
To illustrate this idea, consider an example of some importance, namely the
issue of garbage collection. The need for forced garbage collection has been
argued on several occasions[14, 6, 9], but the value of this strategy to system
rule has not been analyzed previously.
The first issue is to determine the currency of this game. What payment
will be transferred from one player to the other in play? Here, there are three
relevant measurements to take into account: (i) the amount of resources con-
sumed by the attacker (or freed by the defender), and sociological rewards: (ii)
‘goodwill’ or (iii) ‘privilege’ which are conferred as a result of sticking to the
policy rules. These latter rewards can most easily be combined into an effec-
tive variable ‘satisfaction’. Then the player who can’t get no satisfaction is the
poorer one. A satisfaction measure is needed in order to balance the situation
in which the system administrator prevents users from using any resources at
all. This is clearly not a defensible use of the system, thus the system defenses
should be penalized for restricting users too much. The characteristic matrix
now has two contributions,
π = πr(resources) + πs(satisfaction). (38)
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It is convenient to define
πr ≡ π(resources) =
1
2
(
Resources won
Total resources
)
. (39)
Satisfaction πs is assigned arbitrarily from values from plus to minus one half,
such that,
−
1
2
≤ πr ≤ +
1
2
−
1
2
≤ πs ≤ +
1
2
−1 ≤ π ≤ +1. (40)
The pay-off is related to the movements made through the lattice ~d. The dif-
ferent strategies can now be regarded as duels, or games of timing.
Users/System Ask to tidy Tidy by date Tidy above Quotas
Threshold
Tidy when asked π(1, 1) π(1, 2) π(1, 3) π(1, 4)
Never tidy π(2, 1) π(2, 2) π(2, 3) π(2, 4)
Conceal files π(3, 1) π(3, 2) π(3, 3) π(3, 4)
Change timestamps π(4, 1) π(4, 2) π(4, 3) π(4, 4)
The elements of the characteristic matrix must now be modelled by suitable
algebraic or constant terms. The rate at which users produce files may be
written
ru =
nbrb + ngrg
nb + ng
, (41)
where rb is the rate for bad users and rg is the rate for good users. The total
number of users nu = nb + ng. From the authors experience, the ratio nb/ng is
about one percent. The rate can be expressed as a scaled number between zero
and one, for convenience, so that rb = 1− rg.
The payoff in terms of the consumption of resources by users, to the users
themselves, is then
πu =
1
2
∫ T
0
dt
ru (sin(2πt/24) + 1)
Rtot
, (42)
where the factor of 24 is the human daily rhythm, measured in hours, and Rtot
is the total amount of resources to be consumed. Note that, by considering only
good user or bad users, one has a corresponding expression for πg and πb, with
ru replaced by rg or rb respectively. An automatic garbage collection system
results in a negative pay-off to users, i.e. a pay-off to the system administrator.
This may be written
πa = −
1
2
∫ T
0
dt
ra (sin(2πt/Tp) + 1)
Rtot
, (43)
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where Tp is the period of execution for the automatic system, considered earlier.
This is typically hourly or more often, so the frequency of the automatic cycle is
some twenty times greater than that of the human cycle. The rate of resource-
freeing ra is also greater than ru, since file deletion takes little time compared
to file creation, and also an automated system will be faster than a human.
The quota payoff yields a fixed allocation of resources, which are assumed to
be distributed equally amongst users and thus each quota slice assumed to be
unavailable to other users. The users are nonchalant, so πs = 0 here, but the
quota yields
πq = +
1
2
(
1
nb + ng
)
. (44)
The matrix elements are expressed in terms of these.
π(1, 1): Here πs = −
1
2 since the system administrator is maximally satisfied by
the users’ behaviour. πr is the rate of file creation by good users πg, i.e.
only legal files are produced. Comparing the strategies, it is clear that
π(1, 1) = π(1, 2) = π(1, 3).
π(1, 4): Here πs = 0 since the users are dissatisfied by the quotas, but the system
administrator must be penalized for restricting the functionality of the
system. With fixed quotas, users cannot generate large temporary files.
πq is the fixed quota payoff, a fair slice of the resources. Clearly π(4, 1) =
π(4, 2) = π(4, 3) = π(4, 4). This tells us that quotas put a straight-jacket
on the system. The game has a fixed value if this strategy is adopted by
system administrators. However, it does not mean that this is the best
strategy, according to the rules of the game, since the system administrator
loses points for restrictive practices. This is yet to be determined.
π(2, 1): Here πs =
1
2 since the system administrator is maximally dissatisfied with
users’ refusal to tidy their files. The pay-off for users is also maximal in
taking control of resources, since the system administrator does nothing
to prevent this, thus πr = πu. Examining the strategies, one find that
π(2, 1) = π(3, 1) = π(3, 2) = π(3, 3) = π(4, 1) = π(4, 2).
π(2, 2): Here πs =
1
2 since the system administrator is maximally dissatisfied with
users’ refusal to tidy their files. The pay-off for users is now mitigated
by the action of the automatic system which works in competition, thus
πr = πu − πa. The automatic system is invalidated by user bluffing (file
concealment).
π(2, 3): Here πs =
1
2 since the system administrator is maximally dissatisfied with
users’ refusal to tidy their files. The pay-off for users is mitigated by the
automatic system, but this does not activate until some threshold time
is reached, i.e. until t > t0. Since changing the date cannot conceal files
from the automatic system, when they are tidied above threshold, we have
π(2, 3) = π(4, 3).
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Figure 4: The absolute values of pay-off contributions as a function of time (in
hours), For daily tidying Tp = 24. User numbers are set in the ratio (ng, nb) =
(99, 1), based on rough ratios from the author’s College environment, i.e. one
percent of users are considered mischievous. The filling rates are in the same
ratio: rb/Rtot = 0.99, rg/Rtot = 0.01, ra/Rtot = 0.1. The flat dot-slashed line is
|πq|, the quota pay-off. The lower wavy line is the cumulative pay-off resulting
from good users, while the upper line represents the pay-off from bad users. The
upper line doubles as the magnitude of the pay-off |πa| ≥ |πu|, if we apply the
restriction that an automatic system can never win back more than users have
already taken. Without this restriction, |πa| would be steeper.
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Thus, in summary, the characteristic matrix is given by:
π(u, s) =


− 12 + πg(t) −
1
2 + πg(t) −
1
2 + πg(t) πq
1
2 + πu(t)
1
2 + πu(t) + πa(t)
1
2 + πu(t) + πa(t) θ(t0 − t) πq
1
2 + πu(t)
1
2 + πu(t)
1
2 + πu(t) πq
1
2 + πu(t)
1
2 + πu(t)
1
2 + πu(t) + πa(t) θ(t0 − t) πq

 , (45)
where the step function is defined by,
θ(t0 − t) =
{
1 (t ≥ t0)
0 (t < t0)
, (46)
and represents the time-delay in starting the automatic tidying system in the
case of tidy-above-threshold.
It is possible to make several remarks about the relative sizes of these con-
tributions. The automatic system works at least as fast as any human so, by
design, in this simple model we have
1
2
≥ |πa| ≥ |πu| ≥ |πg| ≥ 0, (47)
for all times. In addition , for short times πq > πu, but users can quickly fill
their quota and overtake this. In a zero-sum game, the automatic system can
never tidy garbage faster than users can create it, so the first inequality is always
saturated. From the nature of the cumulative pay-offs, we can also say that
(
1
2
+ πu) ≥ (
1
2
+ πu + πaθ(t0 − t)) ≥ (
1
2
+ πu + πa), (48)
and
|
1
2
+ πu| ≥ |πg −
1
2
|. (49)
Let us now apply these results to a modest strategy of automatic tidying, of
garbage, once per day, in order to illustrate the utility of the game formulation.
The first step is to compute the pay-off rate contributions. Referring to figure 4,
one sees that the automatic system can always match users’ moves. As drawn,
the daily ripples of the automatic system are in phase with the users’ activity.
This is not realistic, since tidying would normally be done at night when user
activity is low, however such details need not concern us in this illustrative
example.
The policy we have created in setting up the rules of play for the game,
penalizes the system administrator for employing strict quota shares. Even so,
users do not gain much from this, because quotas are constant for all time. A
quota is a severe handicap to users in the game, except for very short times
before users reach their quota limits. Quotas could be considered cheating in
such a game, since they determine the outcome even before play commences.
There is no longer a contest. Moreover, comparing the values in the figure,
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it is possible to see how resource inefficient quotas are. Users cannot create
temporary files which exceed these hard and fast quotas. An immunity type
model which allows fluctuations is a considerably more resource efficient strat-
egy, since it allows users to span all the available resources for short periods of
time, without consuming them for ever.
Any two-person zero-sum game has a solution, either in terms of a pair of
optimal pure strategies or as a pair of optimal mixed strategies[10, 11]. This
result is known as the minimax theorem and was proved by Von Neumann. The
solution is found as the balance between one player’s attempt to maximize his
pay-off and the other player’s attempting to minimize the opponent’s result.
In general one can say of the pay-off matrix that
max
↓
min
→
πrc ≤ min
→
max
↓
πrc, (50)
where the arrows refer to the directions of increasing rows (↓) and columns (→).
The left hand side is the least users can hope to win (or conversely the most
that the system administrator can hope to keep) and the right is the most users
can hope to win (or conversely the least the system admin can hope to keep).
If we have
max
↓
min
→
πrc = min
→
max
↓
πrc, (51)
it implies the existence of a pair of single, pure strategies (r∗, c∗) which are
optimal for both players, regardless of what the other does. If the equality
is not satisfied, then the minimax theorem tells us that there exist optimal
mixtures of strategies, where each player selects at random from a number of
pure strategies with a certain probability weight.
The situation for our time-dependent example matrix is different for small
t and for large t. The distinction depends on whether users have had time to
exceed fixed quotas or not; thus ‘small t’ refers to times when users are not
impeded by the imposition of quotas.
For small t, we have:
max
↓
min
→
πrc = max
↓


πg −
1
2
1
2 + πu + πa
1
2 + πu
1
2 + πu + πa θ(t0 − t)


=
1
2
+ πu. (52)
The ordering of sizes in the above minimum vector is:
1
2
+ πu ≥
1
2
+ πu + πaθ(t0 − t) ≥ πu + πaθ(t0 − t) ≥ πg −
1
2
. (53)
This is useful to know, if we should examine what happens when certain strate-
gies are eliminated. For the opponent’s endeavours we have
min
→
max
↓
πrc = min
→
(
1
2
+ πu,
1
2
+ πu,
1
2
+ πu, πq)
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=
1
2
+ πu. (54)
This indicates that the equality in eqn. (51) is satisfied and there exists at least
one pair of pure strategies which is optimal for both players. In this case, the
pair is for users to conceal files, and for the system administrator to tidy by any
means (these all contribute the same weight in eqn (54). Thus for small times,
the users are always winning the game if we assume that they are allowed to
bluff by concealment. If the possibility of concealment or bluffing is removed
(perhaps through an improved technology used by the administrator), then the
next best strategy is for users to bluff by changing the date. In that case, the
best system administrator strategy is to tidy at threshold.
These results make qualitative sense and tally well with the author’s expe-
rience. The result also makes a prediction for system administration tools like
cfengine. Cfengine must be able to see through attempts at bluffing if it is to
be an effective opponent against the worst users.
For large times (when system resources are becoming or have become scarce),
then the situation looks different. In this case one finds that
max
↓
min
→
πrc = min
→
max
↓
πrc = πq. (55)
In other words, the quota solution determines the outcome of the game for any
user strategy. As already commented, this might be considered cheating or poor
use of resources, at the very least. If one eliminates quotas from the game, then
the results for small times hold also at large times.
This simple example of system administration as a strategic game between
users and administrators was not intended to be as realistic as possible, rather
it was intended as an illustration of the principles involved. Nevertheless, it is
already clear that user bluffing and system quotas are strategies which are to be
avoided in an efficient system. By following this basic plan, it should be possible
to analyze more complex situations in future work.
9.5 The policy P (t) and the pay-off matrix pi(t)
At the beginning of this paper, we referred to a central axiom which involved the
changing system policy P (t). The characteristic (pay-off) matrix πrc(t) must
clearly be related to this policy.
Let us suppose that the pay-off matrix is a u×smatrix, with u user strategies
and s system strategies. The administrators strategies are limited by the policy,
and the rewards are also limited, so both the dimension s and form of the pay-off
matrix are functions of the policy. The user’s strategies cannot be assumed to be
limited by policy however, since ‘criminal’ users will ignore policy for personal
gain. Although one may think of the dimension s[P (t)] as being a functional of
the policy, it would not be correct to think of u as being a functional of the policy,
since there can be no restriction on what users will try, simply as a result of
law-giving. User’s actions can only be restricted by applying counter-measures
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within the
π = πrs[P (t)](P (t)). (56)
It should be noted, however, that there can be no unique mapping between
policy and pay-off matrix.
9.6 Change and future models
Expressing deterministic changes in generic computer systems would be a huge
undertaking unless one restricted ambitions to general features and trends. Dy-
namical systems are difficult to trace, even in the simplest of cases, so one cannot
expect to get very far without making significant simplifications. The aim of
considering a dynamical theory is thus to characterize the significant trends of
change which might occur, owing to idealized influences. A full discussion of
this topic is beyond the scope of the present paper, however based on the ax-
ioms and deliberations presented here, it is possible to outline the way forward
in studying them.
The expression of strategies in the previous section is too general to be useful
for a fully general, dynamical theory. Taking account of every strategic detail
would be a vast undertaking. Instead, one can analyze the development at the
level of a generic computer system undergoing generic changes as a matter of
principle. The purpose of such a vague preliminary investigation is to eluci-
date the relationship between the system administration game and the lattice
description of the ideal state, presented in section 8.
Once a strategy mixture has been decided, one must address the fact that, in
real-world games, the speed of information is finite. It will take a finite amount
of time for a response to develop after a strategy is implemented. Moves and
counter-moves do not follow a rigid time-plan as in games like chess. This kind
of delay leads to races and duels for superiority between competing players.
Delay is the province of linear response theory.
The aim, then, is to express the causal structure of system development in
the foregoing mathematical language. In order to reduce the dynamical game to
algebra we must express each of these in terms of basic primitives. Causality is
about relating actions to outcomes, or changes of state δS. A general action A(t)
is built up from a number of primitive action-types Ta (called the generators for
the action transformation) in a linear combination
A(t) =
∑
i
ai(t)Ti (57)
where ai(t) are functions of time (not necessarily differentiable, often step-like)
and i takes values which number the full spectrum of primitive actions. The T i
are orthogonal vectors or matrices (indices suppressed), one for each primitive
action type, which span an abstract vector space. This vector space is the
chequerboard on which the game takes place.
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Each complete action A(t), results in a change in the state of the system,
which may be denoted δS. An action can also be a causal chain of sub-actions,
characterizing a sequence of changes in the state. This type of causal rela-
tionship is summarized by a Green function, propagator, or response-function
formulation[15, 16]:
δS(t) =
∫
dt′G(t, t′)A(t′), (58)
where G(t, t′) is the two-point response function, as yet unspecified. If the rules
of the game are independent of time, then G(t, t′) = G(t−t′); if the rules change
over time, then G(t, t′) = G(t−t′, t+t′). In this language of dynamical systems,
an action plays the role of a source or driving force for the system. The equation
above may be inverted to provide an inhomogeneous differential equation for the
changing state of the system. If one formally introduces a differential operator
Dt which is the inverse of the response function:∫
dt′ Dt G(t, t
′) = 1, (59)
then the differential equation may be written, schematically:
DtS(t) = A(t), (60)
where, as ad hoc an example one might have,
Dt ≡
d2
dt2
+ iγ
d
dt
+ ω20 , (61)
for an approximately periodic system which degrades over time, like a damped
harmonic oscillator. Each action A(t) thus leads to a response or change of state;
this in turn implies that the state of the system must be a linear combination
of the same action types:
S(t) =
∑
i
si(t)Ti. (62)
The state is thus defined on the same lattice, or chequerboard as the actions
themselves. Differential (difference) characterizations of state have been studied
in ref. [7]; this type of description is interesting, since it leads often to rich
dynamics. Alternating periods of change and stability (riffles and pools in the
flow of the system) might be best described by a difference representation.
Returning to the idea of the contest as a game, one writes a strategy as
a statistical mixture of actions (i.e. moves in the game) A(t), applied over
an interval of time. This stochastic mixture specifies the boundary conditions
under which the actions are applied. It may be formed as a linear combination
of basic actions An, with probability weights wn:
J(t) =
∑
n
wnAn(t) =
∑
i
piTi, (63)
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The strategy vector Ji is the vector of probabilities for each primitive action,
given the chosen mixture of full actions An for J . In other words, Ji are the
components of the decomposition of the strategy J(t) on the space of primitive
actions.
pi =
∑
n
wn. (64)
It is easy to normalize these so as to be actual probabilities which sum to unity
∑
i
pi ≡ 1. (65)
Notice that the specific representation of basis generators Ti does not affect
the strategy vector, since it only serves to label the lattice-work of independent
actions. There is no unique labelling. The components with respect to the basis
must be related by a response function Πij(t, t
′)
δSi =
∫
dt′ Πij(t, t
′)Jj(t
′). (66)
The matrix value distribution is related to the pay-off matrix, and a basis of
so-called ladder operators, also called creation and annihilation operator. The
represent do-action/undo-action operations of the users and system administra-
tor.
Π(t, t′) ∼ πij ⊗ 〈~d|Sˆ+(t)Sˆ−(t
′)|~d〉 (67)
where Sˆ± are operators which annihilate a configuration state at t
′ and create
a new configuration at time t. This is the generic mechanism by which the
system develops. This form of description might seem unnecessarily formal,
but it is actually highly useful, since the continuous generalization of this kind
of dynamical system has been widely studied in statistical field theory. By
picking out universal features of statistical models and restricting the scope of
the computer system, there is a real chance of being able to build toy models
which have qualitative, predictive power. However, this is no trivial undertaking
and will be considered in a later paper[17].
Since the actions which configure a computer system form a lattice, and
these primitive action types do not necessarily commute with one another, one
concludes that a suitable idealization of the system administration’s stochastic
dynamics is found in non-Abelian, statistical field theories. This line of study
would be suitable for modelling resource availabilities for large numbers of users,
in which all users behave approximately equally on average (like an ideal gas).
This approach promises therefore to be relevant to the problem of anomaly
detection[8] and will be returned to in later work.
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10 Summary
The aim of this paper has been to formulate a trustworthy framework for ana-
lyzing models of system administration. There is good cause to view computers
as dynamical systems, approximated by mechanistic rules developing in time,
with idealized properties which can be summarized by a finite state lattice. The
theory of games has been employed in order to select between alternative strate-
gies in a contest for machine resources, moving the state of the system through
the lattice, as if on a chequerboard. It has been shown that it is possible to see
system administration as the effort to keep the system close to an ideal state, by
introducing countermeasures in the face of competitive resource consumption.
This is the formal basis which opens the way for objective analyses in the field.
It is important to understand that, even an answer obtained with the as-
sistance of a mathematical formalism is not necessarily the last word on the
subject. Mathematics is only a tools for relating assumptions to conclusions,
in an impartial way. With a mathematical approach, it becomes easier to see
through personal opinions and vested interests when assumptions and methods
are clearly and rigorously appraised. However, one can only distinguish between
those possibilities which are taken into account. That means that every relevant
strategy, or alternative, has to be considered, or else one could miss the crucial
combination which wins the game. This is the limitation of game theory. It is
not generally possible to determine strategies without creative input; this means
that human intelligence will be required for the foreseeable future. There can be
no zero-maintenance computer system. With this caution, how can one know
that the ideal state of a system can be reached? How can one know that the
system will not run away in an unstable spiral to catastrophe?
Two things are clear from the limited analysis here. The first is that purely
dumb automatic systems are inadequate to perform every task in system admin-
istration today. Intelligent incursions are required to solve complex problems,
to extend or adjust the strategies of the automatic system. Interestingly, this
is the approach by which evolution has solved the immunity problem: the au-
tomatic responses of lymphocytes only go so far; the emergence of intelligence
in humans has enabled us to develop medical research and develop drugs and
other treatments against damage and disease. It seems naive to believe that
any simple mechanistic system would be able to do any better than this; we can
expect to require the assistance of humans at least until alternative machine
intelligences have been developed.
The second point is that the use of quotas is a highly inefficient way of
counteracting the effects of selfish users. A quota strategy can never approach
the same level of productivity as one which is based on competitive counterforce.
The optimal strategies for garbage collection are rather found to lie in the realm
of the immunity model[2]. However, it is a sobering thought that a persistent
user, who is able to bluff the immune system into disregarding it, (like a cancer)
will always win against the resource battle. The need for new technologies which
can see through bluffs will be an ever present reality in the future. With the
ability of encryption and compression systems to obscure file contents, this is a
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contest which will not be easily won by system administrators.
There is plenty of work to be done on the theory of system administration.
This paper is merely a small push in the direction of progress.
I am grateful to Trond Reitan for a useful discussion about evolutionary
stable strategies and to H˚arek Haugerud, Lars Kristiansen and particularly Sig-
mund Straumsnes for their critical readings of the manuscript.
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